

ISSN (Paper) : 2580-6378

ISSN (Online) : 2580-7048



**ASIA
PACIFIC
STUDIES**

**Journal of International Relations Department
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Christian University of Indonesia**

Volume 1 | Number 1 | January- June 2017

THE ROOT CAUSES AND NEXUS OF MILITANT ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA: CASE STUDIES OF DARUL ISLAM AND JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

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Manuscript received 13 October 2016; Reviewed 16 November 2016; Published 10 January 2017

Abstract

Many scholars believe that every religion has its peaceful interpretation as well as violent practices. Yet, this article elaborates more on the Islamic radical movements in Indonesia, particularly on the questions of what factors have triggered them to conduct such violence, how they linked each other and what action should be taken by the Indonesian government to counter-terrorism. To answer the question, the paper will focus on the ideology part and organization network of Darul Islam (DI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which shared similar ideology, network and methods of recruitment. Authors argue that ideology and organization become vital elements for DI and JI, in which the government, coupled with all stakeholders, should pay more attention if they want to eradicate violence in the name of religion. Although there is "no prescription fits all" in eradicating terrorism, the ability to understand the root causes and organization network of terrorism in Indonesia will help the government and all stakeholders to establish a proper strategy.

Key words: Counter-terrorism, salafi jihadism, Darul Islam, Jemaah Islamiyah

Abstrak

Banyak pengamat percaya bahwa setiap agama mengandung interpretasi damai sekaligus juga tindak kekerasan. Namun, artikel ini akan mengulas lebih banyak tentang gerakan radikal Islam di Indonesia, terutama yang terkait dengan faktor-faktor apa saja yang mendorong mereka melakukan aksi kekerasan, bagaimana kelompok-kelompok tersebut saling memiliki keterkaitan dan tindakan apa yang perlu diambil oleh pemerintah Indonesia dalam melakukan kontra-terorisme. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, paper ini akan menjelaskan ideologi dan jaringan organisasi dari Darul Islam (DI) dan Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), di mana keduanya memiliki kemiripan termasuk juga dalam metode rekrutmen. Penulis berpendapat bahwa ideologi dan organisasi merupakan elemen penting bagi DI dan JI. Oleh karena itu, pemerintah dan seluruh elemen masyarakat harus memperhatikan hal ini jika ingin memberantas kekerasan atas nama agama. Walaupun tidak ada "resep ampuh" yang dapat mengatasi terorisme, kemampuan untuk memahami akar permasalahan dan jaringan organisasi kelompok terorisme di Indonesia akan membantu pemerintah dan seluruh elemen masyarakat untuk menyusun strategi yang tepat.

Kata Kunci: Counter-terrorism, salafi jihadisme, Darul Islam, Jemaah Islamiyah

1. Introduction

Sociologists believe that all religions have two faces, just like two sides of coins. The first face is that justifies the peaceful, harmony, tolerant interpretation and the second one is the one that support violent interpretation. Following the idea that religions can be a message of violence, there have been number of examples when militant across religious followers have used theology of violence to legitimize their violent actions.

Every religion has this nature. In Islam, 'jihad' despite its multi interpretative meanings, has been interpreted for violence. Literally, the word 'jihad' means 'to struggle or to persevere.' (Bonner, 2006) Al Quran itself seldom uses the term 'jihad' as warfare. Primarily, Quran relates this word with the notion of "*jihad fil sabil Allah*," which means that Moslems should strive in a way to serve merely the purpose of God, perform their devotion to Allah and please Him *per se*. (Heck, 2004) However, the violence carried out by Salafi Jihadists, such as members of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the world, lead many people to misinterpret and relate the idea with violence in the name of Islam.

Christian leaders have also promoted hard line action and violence as the manifestation of liberation theology to uplift their underdeveloped followers. The Catholic Bishop Meeting in Rome in 1971 hailed action on behalf of justice and liberation of people from every oppression. The French Priest Rene Laurentin observed the following year that "violence has taken on considerable importance to days as a means of exorcising the underdevelopment" (Appleby, 2000). The Hindus groups used "Hindutva (Hindu-ness) to reconstruct their religion teaching around their nationalist theme to reject to the secular, pluralistic states and would replace it with Hinduized states. Their robust objection was clearly seen through attacks towards Christians, Moslems and their worship places in India. Just like the instrumentalization of jihad to replace pluralistic state with Islamic state. The religious followers who believe in violent ways manipulate theological interpretation to legitimize their purpose.

Terror as an action is resulted in militant thoughts and attitude. If collectively shared, they will form militant movements. In Islamic society, theoretical explanation of the roots of the militant movements can be summarized at least into two aspects: *First*, internal aspects, which relates the narrow interpretation of religious dogma, that is the degree of openness in interpreting religious teachings and dogma. No matter the interpretation is correct or wrong, such narrow interpretation then serves as an ideology of the movement. *The second* is the perception of external factor that is the feeling of being marginalized and unjustly treated in economics, politics and social life such as education. The media, which broadcast the poor condition of Moslem in politics, economy and social life has played important role in forming that feeling.

This paper focuses more on the ideology and the dynamics of the organization network of Darul Islam (DI) and Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. The two important elements in understanding the nature of their ideology that justifies the action while organization directly or indirectly provides support with logistics and infrastructures. Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) has elaborated much on the role of organization backing up religion-inspired terrorists. Behind the killer of Yitzak Rabin, Yigal Amir, there is a big Zionist movements operating inside and outside Israel. Behind Timothy Mc Veigh, and Buford Furrow, the bomber of Bulding of Jews Reservation, there was a branch of militant Christians who grows very rapidly in the US. In Muslim society, the sniper of Anwar Sadat, Khaled Islambouli was a militant member of segregated Ikhwanul Muslimin known as *Takfir wal Hijra*.

2. Root Causes of Terrorism

There is a polarized debate about the underlying causes of violent extremism in Islamic world. In one hand, analysts believe some people become radicals as they are influenced by the external situation such as discrimination, injustice, oppression, and other violence towards them or their group, which has led them to become terrorists. Therefore the struggle against terrorism should prioritize on social and economic development as well as educational empowerment, since poverty and grievance often provide a fertile land for extremism. Other analysts examine the internal factors and question the nexus between socio economic problems and extremism. They argue that many terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated. They are convinced that narrow-minded jihadist ideology and internal psychological aspects serve as the root causes.

Other researches like Kumar Ramakrishna (2009) analyze more variables to explain violent behavior of certain people as he noticed that not all discriminated and suppressed people, nor *pasantren* (Islamic school) students became terrorists. He concluded that it is not a single factor that attracts people to become terrorists and radicals. Instead, it is a product of interaction between existential identity, culture and a complex set of individual personality variables. The variables involved the structural factors such as geopolitical developments, local historical forces, ideology, and the small group context that comprise the environmental ‘situation’ that created individual personality. The combination between internal and external factors created what so-called the “situated individual personality.” Departing from this combination, there are at least three theories to explain the root causes of terrorism in Indonesia:

- a. **Perceived injustice and socio-economic grievances:** Most terrorists have been discriminated and are victimized by of prejudice, injustice or violence both in the workplace and in society. Accordingly, they want retaliation. Some terrorist masterminds work on these frustrations and manipulate their followers’ minds using religious and communal arguments. Approximately 23 percent of Indonesian youths are unemployed, which is far above the national average of 7 percent. (Christian Science Monitor, 2011) The unemployment rate leads to social and economic frustrations. Many militant groups then search the solution by offering the radical change of the current secular state into the Islamic state. Their offer sought to appeal the increasingly disenfranchised youths who believe Indonesia’s secular government has failed them.
- b. **Bonding between friends and family:** Marc Sageman (2004), a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency officer in Afghanistan, found that 88 percent terrorists chose their violent action not because they wanted to change the world but because they had friendship as well as family bonds to jihadists. Sixty-eight percent either had preexisting friendships with people that were already in the group or part of the group who collectively joined the group. This is typical of the Hamburg group that conducted the 9/11 attacks. Another 20 percent had close family bonds to jihadists.
- c. **Ignorance and lack of knowledge about Islam:** One main point why people may become radicalized and turned into terrorists is that they neglect the true nature of Islam. Interestingly, terrorists who claim to be motivated by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. In fact many of the participants in rehabilitation program did not have much formal education or proper religious instruction and had only a limited and incomplete understanding of Islam teachings. (Christian Science Monitor, 2011)

3. The Role of Ideology

The term of ideology here refers to how one or group view the world that surrounds them. Ideology becomes the major element for a group to achieve their goals and conduct their actions, including the using of violence. In this regard, religion can be the subject or the object of violence behavior. As the subject, religions such as Jews, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, often justify the using of intimidations and violence towards their followers in order to reach their target. Any religion also provides terrorist groups with motivation, structure and means of struggle. (Juergensmeyer, 2000)

The current radical ideology interpreted from the Islamic teaching has drawn attention particularly since the 9/11 attacks. The teaching itself is derived from Sayyid Qutb idea in which the terrorist-members claimed themselves more as the protectors of the coming Islamic revolution. Their main goal is to restore a Caliphate system which sets out the determination of Islamic *Sharia* and ensures it operates along its guidelines (Stout, 2009) To establish such system, Qutb allows every *jahiliyyah*, which is defined as states that rejects God's authority and Islamic rules, to be fought and overthrown with extreme measures (Shepard, 2003). This idea obviously provides justification for the toppling of all world governments that fits the *jahiliyyah* category by a global war, including states governed by Moslems. (Zimmerman, 2004)

The ideology of the terrorist is the way they view the world that surround them, more specifically that directly influence the life of Moslems nationally and internationally. From international dimension, the terrorists view that the position of the West led by the US in the Middle East conflict between Israel and Palestine as being one sided in favor of Israel. This policy has also been exacerbated by the US attack to Afghanistan and Iraq. They are even sure that the next target will be either Iran or Syria. In this point of view, non-Muslims, which see as similar to the West, will never be happy with the resurgence of Islam. (Huntington, 1993)

From the national dimension, the ideology of terrorist can be traced from Abdullah Sungkar teachings. He asserted that Islam never teaches nationalism, so that there is no Indonesian country in Islamic concept. He perceived that the universe, where Indonesia is in belongs to Allah. He also argues that the naming of Indonesia was a coincidence as this country is located between Melanesia and India. Nationalism destroys the theological concept of Muslims. In line with this, Abdullah Sungkar rejected all national symbols like National flag and national anthem. Instead, he was in favor of Islamic Caliphate system, that is a universal, transnational state, established on the spirit of Islamic brotherhood and *tawhid*. He argued that when Caliphate system - the lost political concept in Islam - is established, Islam becomes a respected religion. (Nursalim, 2001)

The first preparation step to make this idea comes true is by establishing Islamic states in each Islamic countries. When the time comes, such countries will be united under the caliphate confederation (Nursalim, 2001) Jema'ah Islamiyah's activists, who sought to establish Daulah Nusantara, strongly believe this idea. A Caliphate confederation is planned to embrace Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South of Thailand and South Philippines. The idea of Caliphate implicitly calls for the implementation of *Shariah law* in all Moslem countries. Consequently, terrorists will view any regime in Indonesia who doesn't officially formalize Islamic states will be considered as "infidel government" which deserve rebel. Interestingly, contemporary Islamic paramilitary groups like Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) doubted such ideology. Instead, these two paramilitaries are less ideological although they are more "attractive" and are easier to dissolve as has happened to Laskar Jihad.

4. The Organization Network

Many observers believe that contemporary terrorists in Indonesia are developed from JI network. Such belief is fifty percent true and fifty percent not. JI is a new regional network. The fact is that the history of terror in Indonesia long predates to the existence of JI. It can be learnt from the history of Darul Islam (DI) whose embryo can be traced back to the history of Independence War. During that time Muslim fighters established paramilitary Hizbullah (soldiers of Allah). Hizbullah together with other Dutch trained soldiers and Japanese trained soldiers were then united in the national army (ABRI).

Despite its defeat, DI movements existed in all political regimes in Indonesia. Until to day the movement has come to its fifth generations. The first generation was the founder of DI who rebelled the national government and was aimed at establishing Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII), the militant activist calls it as N eleven (N sebelas/N11). The leader of the first generation was the late Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo. This group was disappointed with the Renville agreement and the failure of Islamic leaders in having Islam as the ideology of the state and inserting "Djakarta Charter" in the constitution. The charter is later known as the seven words "*with the obligation for Moslems to practice their shariah.*" This movement then inspired other two Islamic movements: DI of South of Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar and DI of Aceh led by Daud Beureuh. The motive behind the DI rebellion movement in Aceh was slight different. They felt being betrayed by Jakarta government, which integrated Aceh in the North Sumatra province.

The second generation started in the aftermath of the defeat of Kartosuwiryo who was then sentenced to death in 1962. This period is called "the head down period" or silence period. The strategy responded the defeat of the movement. In this generation there was no significant movements emerged. The leader of the second generation was Adah Djaelani. The third generation started in line with the dynamics of cold war. The rise of the third generation was motivated by the rise of communist in the South East Asia. The activist of the third generation was invited by elites from the intelligent body to activate the network with the official aim at dealing with the spread of communism threat. The leaders of the third generation were Haji Ismail Pranoto (HISPRAN) in Java and Gaos Taufik in Sumatra. This period was called as consolidation period. During this period, terror tragedies recurred anywhere involving DI activists using the name of Komando Jihad (Jihad command). Among their actions were hijacking Garuda Airplane, known as Woyla tragedy and BCA and Borobudur temple Bombings.

During this time, the recruitment of members was developed through *Usroh* method, an exclusive sermon system developed by Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt. In this method around five participants received Islamic teaching but were then continued to "militanization training". It was then uncovered, that this generation was instrumentalized by political elites targeting at discrediting Islam. DI members believed that the government at that time was planning to enforce mono-ideology (Azaz Tunggal), Pancasila for all political and social organizations. In this period, Ngruki Boarding School in Solo was established by HISPRAN, Abdullah Sungkar dan Abu Bakar Baashir. This record shows that terror involving DI activists long predated the existence of JI. It was also proved that the tragedy was not simply criminal, nor simply religion-motivated terrors. There was a political plot behind it.

The fourth generation started after DI activists were aware that their network had been used for political purposes. DI movements then split into factions: (1) Atjeng Kurnia faction covering Bogor, Serang, Purwakarta, and Subang; (2) Ajengan Masduki faction covering Cianjur, Purwokerto, Subang, Jakarta, and Lampung; (3) Abdul Fatah Wiranagapati faction covering Garut,

Bandung, Surabaya, and Kalimantan; (4) Gaos Taufik faction, covering Sumatera; (5) Abdullah Sungkar faction, covering Jawa Tengah and Yogyakarta; (6) Ali Hate faction, covering Sulawesi Selatan; and (7) Area XI Comandement led by Abu Toto Syekh Panji Gumilang.

The prominent leader in this period was Abdullah Sungkar and then was replaced by Abu Bakar Ba'ashir. The two leaders were sent for political tribunal in Sukorahardjo, Central Java, allegedly conducted subversion. However before the verdict, they fled to Malaysia and developed the *dakwa* movement there. During his exile, thousands of DI activists were sent to Malaysia and Afghanistan to support Moslem Afghani fighting against former Soviet occupation. Some of them also went to the South of Mindanao to support MILF fighting against central government of the Philippines. In Afghanistan, they joined other fellow Moslems from Malaysia, South of Philippines, South of Thailand, Pakistan and India. Here the activists' understanding about 'jihad' was ultimately shifted into *qital* (war and violence), which rooted in Sayyid Qutb teaching.

However, the idea of Salafi Jihadism triggered division within DI members. The leader of DI who was considered 'abangan', Ajengan Masduki and his followers rejected the idea and the practice of 'jihad' when Sungkar and his Afghanistan alumni proposed this as a means to coup the regime. A robust rejection of the idea forced Sungkar, Ba'asyir and their cadres to leave the organization. (Solahudin, 2011; Singh 2004) With the military skill they learnt from Afghanistan military camp, the DI fourth generation, along with their international fellow, established regional militant network later known as *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)*.

At the end of his tenure, Suharto changed his political strategy from exercising pressure to approach to Moslem community, which can be seen through his support to the establishment ICMI (Islamic Intellectual Association of Indonesia) and Shari'ah banks like Bank Muamalat. His policy later known as "politics of accommodation." Nonetheless, the fourth generation of DI kept questioning the regime and persisted to be an underground movement. When the New Order Collapsed, DI activists still believed that there would be "another Suharto" who will enforce another repressive policies towards Islam.

Reformasi era shows different phenomena. The Law no. 2/1999 regarding Political Parties opens up an opportunity for freedom of association that led to mushrooming Islamic political parties. Of 48 political parties permitted to participate in the campaign, 15 were Islamic political parties. The most prominent ones are Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Keadilan (PK), which then changed its name into Partai Keadilan Sosial (PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and Partai Bulan Bintang and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Some of the parties remain struggled to insert Djakarta Charter (piagam Djakarta) as one of their agendas.

This political reality has opened up Islamic activists' eyes and stimulated new hope; a hope that the future Indonesia will become better country for Indonesian Moslems. The new hopes have changed the strategy of some the leaders of the new generation from military to social. They started to establish alliances with other Islamic groups who share the same missions in inserting Djakarta Charter to article 29 of the constitution. The concrete result of the alignment was the establishment of Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia (MMI). This confederation comprised of the fourth generation of DI who believe in the on-going political process united with some small Islamic groups from West Java, Sulawesi, Surabaya Solo and Madura, some Moslem intellectual like Abu Bakaar Baashir, Deliar Noor, Mochtar Naim and other some more ex-Masyumi activists. Within MMI there are also hardliner activists of DI who then connected to JI such as Agus Dwikarna, and Agung Hamid.

Yet, due to rejection to its decision-making mechanism, Abu Bakaar Baashir, the Amirul Mujahidin of MMI, departed from MMI and established Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). Although the US government has openly published JAT as terrorist organization, Indonesian government

remains suspended her statement about JAT. Despite her irresolute comment, many JAT members engaged in terrorist attacks between 2010 and 2013 such as Ahmad Yosefa Hayat (Pino Damaryanto), the suicide bomber at Gereja Bethel Injil Sepenuh (GBIS) Kepunton, Solo, Central Java, 2011.

However, in some fields DI leaders remain believed in military strategy. They are based in three areas: West Java, Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and Central Java. The total numbers of activist with military skills are nearly 100.000. Those who stayed abroad like Al Ghozi and Hambali never enjoyed such hope. Their mind had been covered by the phenomena of international politics reality, which they perceived as discredited more on Islam. The above split has transferred the leadership of DI from the fourth to the fifth generation. The main characteristic of this period is the absence of central leader like ABB. The leadership of the fifth generation was then spread over field leaders who no longer listen to and obey the leader of the fourth generation. The policy of the movements is fully under control of the field leaders.

With the absence of central leadership, the fifth generation of DI had neither central command and nor central control. Some of those having military skills with “die hard” orientation made contact with JI activists operating in Indonesia like Dr Azhari, Hambali and Nordin M Tops, Al Ghozi and then were recruited by JI. The term “die hard” here refers to the persistent attitude of the group which prior violent attack as the sole strategy to pursue their missions. Some Bali bombers, suicide bombers in Makasar, JW Marriot (Asmar Latinsani) and that in Kuningan (Herry Gholun and Rois) are those newly recruited militants. The complication of investigation on Dr Azhari, Nordin M Top, Zulkarnaen, the said new executive leader of JI after the arrest of Hambali can be analyzed from their connection with the hardliner faction of the fifth generation. It is too early to conclude that the suicide bombers are members of JI. The fact was that they are the activists of DI of the fifth generation. The faction who believes in social strategy initially confronted their actions as their actions destroy their strategy to formalize Shariah law through ongoing political process.

5. JI's Regional and Global Network

As noted in Law No. 15/2003, Indonesian government categorizes terrorism as an organized and transnational crime with broad and global network. JI, as the national terrorist network also establishes connection with other Islamic militant groups in South East Asia as well as international. Ideologically, tactically and financially, JI had connected with Al Qaeda (AQ) when previous JI's cadres such as Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Nasir Abas, Imron Baihaqi alias Musthopa, Thoriqudin, Muhaimin Yahya, Mukhlas, Mustaqim, M. Qital, Syawal, Mas Slamet Kastari and Hambali, joined military exercise in Afghanistan in 1990s. Hambali, JI's leader in South East Asia, became prominent as he connected JI with AQ and succeeded to gather funding US\$ 200,000 from AQ for JI's operational in South East Asia region.

In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, all JI cadres met with Moslem militants from Islamic countries. Here, all radicals were not only militarily prepared but also religiously debriefed. They were trained with the capabilities of fighting, bombs assembling, military tactics and the understanding of fiqh, hadits as well as Quran interpretation. (Solahudin, 2011) Like religious schools, in the camp they were taught to return to the system following Islamic rules, politically and economically. Yet, all instructors emphasized ‘jihad,’ as a war, is the only means to achieve their goal - to establish Islamic Caliphate - and to overcome any obstacles. (Weelan, 2011)

To replicate the Afghanistan training camp, Abdulla– Sungkar allegedly moved JI’s main military and religious training to a remote area in Mindanao. The aim was simply to train Islamic militant activists from South East Asia, preparing them with sufficient military capability and Salafi Jihadism ideology. With a good relationship with MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) leader, Salamat Hasyim, Sungkar established Hudaibiyah Camp near MILF’s complex. In this camp, Sungkar appointed Afghanistan’s alumni as instructors and many activists from JI, MILF, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) got training from them. Some of Hudaibiyah students were Zulkifli, Sarwo Edi, Mustakim, Ubaid.

In short, the Islamic militants encounter in both Afghanistan and Mindanao camp, gave opportunities for all cadres to share their experiences and grievances. Through these camps, AQ’s and JI’s leaders easily planted the seeds of Salafi Jihadism ideology into all cadres’ mind. Supported financially by a wealthy Saudi Arabian, Osama Bin Laden, JI and its networking in South East Asia accordingly conducted their organization, recruitment, and operational tactic.

6. Methods of Recruitment and Radicalization

Initially, the DI recruits just like lay Muslim youth who interact with ordinary Muslim such as going to mosques and practices the ordinary Islamic rituals. After having contacted with JI activists and joined the training process, the DI activists disappeared without clear notice to his family. No body knows what they had actually been doing during their absence. This article calls this as the “missing period.” When the newly target went home after their missing, they showed strange behavior. They didn’t even interact with their neighbors, nor practiced ordinary Islamic rituals. This method of recruitment is different with that of *Usrah* in the third generation.

It was most likely that they consider other lay Moslems inclusive of their former religious teacher as “infidel”. This stage has been clearly elaborated by former teacher of Hary Ghulon in the Metro Realita program and Ngruki graduates who are formerly classmates of Asmar Latinsani, Al Ghozi and Muchlas. They even wonder how their classmates turn into terrorists, while they were still in Al Mukmin, Ngruki. With regard to the question how an individual becomes terrorist, the New York Police Department published a document in 2007, explaining the process and stages of individual radicalization, as follow:

1. **Pre-radicalization** is a period when an individual undergoes his daily life before being radicalized.
2. **Self-identification** is a phase when an individual slowly starts to secede himself from his old identity and associated himself with those who have been ideologically radicalized.
3. **Indoctrination** is a stage when an individual intensifies and focuses on what he believes in radical ideology without questioning.
4. **Jihadization** happens when an individual bases their action on their belief. He could conduct any violence as he motivated by narrow religious interpretation.

7. Eradicating Terrors: Some Action and Policy Options

The efforts to fight against terrorism are now focused in the two concentrations. The first is enforcing policy that emphasizes on law enforcement and security measures. This strategy has been implemented consistently, by the governments in Southeast Asia region. Malaysia and Singapore even enforced Internal Security Acts (ISA) which give their security authority to detain a person without trial as a preventive measures. These policies have then been strengthened by improvement in the security policy such regional cooperation and institutional building capacity. Similarly, Indonesian government has improved their intelligence performance by building police academy and renovating the Densus 88/AT.

However, these types of policy only touch the superficial problem. This is a repressive policy, which neither touches the core of problems nor even the roots of terrorism. The tribunal of terrorist even provide more popularity of terrorist since their arguments using Jihad is to fight against international injustice and bad government practices, is perceived as “make sense” to some lay Muslims. For the example, some *pesantren* students in Surakarta perceives the dead Al Ghozi who was sent and was buried in Solo, as a “hero” or “martyr” not as “a terrorist”.

The second action being promoted is dialog, be it inter-civilizational dialog, intercultural dialog or inter-faith dialog. Such actions have successfully been done by moderate Islam organizations and Christian organization supported by international NGO. President SBY also has embarked the idea in the ASEM Summit. Usually such dialogs are taking place among the moderate groups across the believers who have been tolerant, pluralistic and moderate in nature. Very rare, the dialogs take place between the moderate and the militant groups. If there are, then the themes of dialog are those of the debatable, controversial and doctrinal topics, which lead to distance from consensus. In the context of eradicating terrorism, it is more likely that the dialogs just like giving medicine to healthy people, not to say “pouring salt in the ocean”. Although dialog is a democratic way in solving problems and important action to do, it is not specifically to respond the terrorism.

From Moslem sides, the above forums were aimed at improving the image of Islam in the eyes of non-Moslems and international communities. It is believed that international community understands that any terrors conducted by any religion followers are nothing to do with religions as a system of faith. They are something to do with interpretation of religion cultivated or bred in bad international, national policy in economy-politic and social life. The motives to conduct terrorism are religiosity or religious understanding, but not religion. The majority of Indonesian Moslems just like Amrozi, Al Ghozi or Imam Samudra, but they don't turn into a terrorist. The difference is that their interpretation of Islam is different from that of Amrozi, Al Ghozi and Samudra. While the interpretation of the majority Muslims tends to the peaceful sides as relevant to the meaning of Islam itself, terrorist' perception tend to the violent sides. The majority of the Indonesian Moslems grew up and has been socialized about Islamic teachings in different social setting from that of Amrozi and his militant fellows have.

8. Winning the Heart and the Mind of Terrorists

Taking from above analysis, this paper would propose an action so called *Democratic straight forward strategy*. Some experts call it as “Winning the heart and the mind” strategy. This concept consists of certain steps. From international dimension, all peace activists in the world should drive US and its allies to be more just and conduct balance policies to Moslem countries like that of in Palestine, Iraq and Middle East. More concrete, the peace activists should enforce pressure to the US and its allies to reduce their unilateral and security approaches in the Moslem countries.

From national level, the government or peace activists should start to approach the fourth and fifth generation of DI and draw line between those considered to be potential of becoming terrorist and those are not. At the same time, they should start to improve the quality of lives of their family and kids in term of employments, education or may suggest them to establish formal social organization or even political organization so as to officially channel their mission. Most of the family lives in poor economic, social and education especially those living in the village. They don't have permanent jobs.

At this stage dialog can be set up with the concrete themes, like improving the quality of education, eradicating corruption, poverty and so on by avoiding the sensitive themes such as secularism, liberalism which they perceive as the "infidel" vocabularies. Such dialog can build trust as the most important part in building social capital needed to promote democracy. Terrorists are human beings who are subject to change and transformation. After the dialog is successful, the effort can move on to the inner circle, that is the ex Afghan fighters or ex Moro fighter who are supported by militant elements of the fifth generation. However, one must be able to ensure them that they won't be treated in security measures or sent to court. The program should provide them kind of social amnesty and accommodation, understand their past action, their grieves and improve their quality of life.

9. Conclusion

The violent movement in Indonesia using interpretation of Islamic teaching has its own roots in the history of the formation of the Indonesian state. As such, it is not just simply connected with JI operation. Within the regeneration of DI fighters, there was a strategy shift from using violence and military approaches to social and political movements that aimed at inserting Islamic law in the constitution. Moreover, there has been a strategy shift within DI from struggling to establish Islamic states to inserting *Islamic shariah* in the constitution.

Obviously, there is no one prescription fits all in eradicating terrorism. So far like other South East Asian countries, Indonesia has conducted law enforcement, security measures, international agreement and intra-faith dialog to counter-terrorism. Yet terrorism remains existed. At least, we should try other alternative, if a medicine cannot cure the disease. And this requires all stakeholders, nationally and internationally, to improve a fair action to Moslems people, as well as upgrading their quality of life in education, social and economic.

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